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Approved For Release 2002/07/03 : CIA-RDP81-142R000100130022-6

DD/A Registry

77-6598

Executive Registry

77-10054

GSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File

30 DEC 1977

M
2 JAN 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Acting Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Thomas B. Yale
Acting Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT: Background Data for Visit of Jay Solomon,
Administrator, General Services
Administration

1. Action Requested: None; for information only. This memorandum serves as the summary document for a variety of attached documents providing background data considered pertinent to the 11 January visit of Jay Solomon, Administrator of the General Services Administration.

2. Background:

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a. As you are aware, Administrator Solomon is scheduled to visit you on 11 January as a result of your letter of 31 October 1977 requesting his direct assistance in acquiring [redacted] additional leased space for CIA. Your letter and Mr. Solomon's response (basically noncommittal and, we understand, prepared at a very low level in GSA) are Attachments 1 and 2. Attachment 3 is a copy of my covering memorandum providing supporting data justifying the space acquisition and Attachment 4 is an extensive DDA to DCI Colby memorandum detailing CIA's space posture, essentially unchanged since that date. All of these documents are resubmittals and are attached for your convenience.

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SUBJECT: Background Data for Visit of Jay Solomon,
Administrator, General Services Administration

b. In addition to the above, the Office of Logistics has prepared a detailed listing of CY 1978 and CY 1979 space requirements. This listing, Attachment 5, is summarized by directorate and also listed by functional component. Further, a chronology of significant CIA/GSA events pertaining to the specific approval and request for the [redacted] acquisition is provided as Attachment 6. 25X1

c. Two other matters, one directly pertinent to the space issue, may be raised during Mr. Solomon's visit. Attachment 7 is a memorandum to you from John Galuardi, Regional Administrator, GSA, identifying a proposed policy to reduce the space holdings of every agency in the Washington area by 10 percent. This proposal was responded to by the Director of Logistics in a letter provided as Attachment 8. In essence, the response stated that CIA objected strenuously to this proposed policy because CIA had already exceeded optimum efficiency in space utilization and that the blanket policy proposal would impact unfairly. The second matter of possible interest is a response to Mr. Joseph Malaga, Executive Director of the Administrative Services Reorganization Project. Mr. Malaga had requested CIA input into a study being developed on the efficacy of centralized administrative services, principally GSA. The response provided as Attachment 9 is essentially bland but identifies space acquisition and maintenance as the major area of CIA concern.

3. Staff Position:

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a. It is considered that acquisition of at least [redacted] of additional leased space is absolutely essential to meet CIA's existing and projected operational requirements. It is believed that the provided supporting data fully substantiates this position.

b. Additionally, GSA personnel in the supervisory working level have toured the Langley facility and concur that additional space is fully warranted. If [redacted] were to be acquired applying existing utilization ratios, CIA's office space utilization would increase from 126 square feet per person (sfp) to approximately 134 sfp. If, however, CIA were to apply a 150 sfp standard for all space in the Washington area using existing ratios, up to [redacted] of additional space could be justified. 25X1 25X1

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SUBJECT: Background Data for Visit of Jay Solomon,
Administrator, General Services Administration

4. Recommendations: It is recommended that Mr. Solomon be given strong inducement to acquire [redacted] of additional leased space on behalf of CIA, using exceptional procedures if necessary. In the event that Mr. Solomon is not supportive of this position, it is recommended that you seek an exception to the GSA position at the Presidential level.

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
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[redacted]
Thomas B. Yale

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History of Additional Space Request (condensed):

25X1 --Colby approved seeking [redacted] on 1 Dec 75, and request made of GSA on 10 Dec 75.

--GSA bureaucracy takes over, validates request, draws up specifications, etc.

--GSA advises in Sept 76 that all additional space acquisitions frozen pending establishment of national priorities.

--GSA accepts request in Jan 77 and commences search in geographical area defined by us.

--Next several months taken up in search, revising specifications in order to obtain more satisfactory offerings, etc.

--New specifications and wider geographic parameters submitted to GSA in Sept 77.

--GSA advises on 20 Sept that complete ban on acquiring new space in effect.

--Several exchanges of correspondence on matter since then, but no movement.

Major justifications for space acquisition:

General - Loss of employee efficiency and lower morale because of overcrowding.

- Loss of flexibility in meeting special space requirements.

- High failure and personnel safety risks of overcrowding special equipment. (OJCS computer equipment, when expanded, will occupy [redacted] the manufacturer's recommended space requirements are [redacted]. Further, the main computer room is badly outdated in terms of utilities and facility environment but cannot be renovated without interruption of service).

- Supporting services are inefficient or curtailed. (Space originally designed for storage or maintenance support has been "captured" for office or equipment space. Utility systems are overcrowded or dispersed and maintenance operations are delayed or inefficient because of unavailability of materiel and work space.)

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25X1 Specific - Needed expansion for CAMS, ADSTAR, and main computer center equal [redacted]

25X1 - New requirements are with us now that were not factored into the [redacted] request:

- a. An indeterminate amount of space for NITC.
- b. Expansion of O/DCI units, e.g., OGC, IG, OLC, Public Affairs.

DD/A Registry

FIG. B+G-9

25X1 Comments on Space Requirements Paper to DCI.

[redacted]
Executive Officer/DDA

DD/A 78-0241

19 January 1978

Mr. McDonald
D/Office of Logistics

Jim:

Your office did the basic memo that was sent to the DCI covering our space requirements. I thought you might be interested in Jack Blake's buckslip comments to the DCI as well as the skeletal outline that was used.

Obviously Jack would like to have all of these retained for possible future use.

[redacted]
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Dist: Orig - RS D/OL w/att
✓RS DDA Subj w/att
RS DDA Chrono w/o
RS [redacted] Chrono w/o

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DD/A 77-6598; Background Data for Visit of J. Solomon, Admin, GSA (space requirements).

INDEX TO ATTACHMENTS

INDEX TO ATTACHMENTS

Attachment 1 - Letter dtd 31 Oct 77 to Administrator, GSA, fm DCI, general subject: Acquisition of Additional Leased Space

Attachment 2 - Letter dtd 28 Nov 77 to DCI fm Administrator, GSA, general subject: Acquisition of Additional Leased Space

Attachment 3 - Memo dtd 26 Oct 77 to DCI fm A-DDA, subject: Space Acquisition

Attachment 4 - Memo dtd 24 Nov 75 to DCI fm DDA, subject: Real Property Requirements in the Metropolitan Washington Area

Attachment 5 - Summary of Headquarters, External and Additional Space Requirements for FY 78 and 79

Attachment 6 - Summary of Events: Agency Actions to Acquire Space through GSA

Attachment 7 - Letter dtd 28 Nov 77 to DCI fm Regional Administrator, GSA, general subject: Proposed Policy for Acquiring Space in the National Capital Region

Attachment 8 - Letter dtd 28 Dec 77 to Regional Administrator, GSA, fm D/L, general subject: Agency Response to GSA Proposed Policy for Acquiring Space in the National Capital Region

Attachment 9 - Letter dtd 4 Nov 77 to Executive Director, ASRP, OMB, fm A-DDA, general subject: Organizational and Procedural Improvements to Centrally Provided Federal Administrative Services

Attachment 10 - CIA Real Property Holdings - National Capital Region

31 Oct. 1911

470 JOURNAL OF CLIMATE

The Honorable Joel W. Solomon
Administrator
General Services Administration
Washington, D.C. 20405.

Dear Jay:


(U) Further to our passing exchange at the White House last week regarding CIA's inability to acquire new leased space, the requirement for this space is urgent, and I would appreciate your assistance in solving this problem. As noted in the 27 September letter to you from my Acting Deputy, CIA's space requirements are long-standing and are essential to support congressionally approved projects now coming to fruition.

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SEARCHED	INDEXED	SERIALIZED	FILED
SEARCHED	INDEXED	SERIALIZED	FILED
MAY 10 1968			
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION			
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE			

WARNING: SENSITIVE INFORMATION
AND MATERIAL

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(C) In sum, CIA's requirement for [REDACTED] of space is real, represents essential support of projects and equipment costing [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] and is considered essential to the effective functioning of CIA. In the absence of other alternatives which, hopefully, you may be able to identify, this requirement is considered sufficiently in the national interest to warrant appeal to the President for exception. I would appreciate your reconsideration of this matter and advice as to how best to proceed to meet CIA's space needs in a timely manner. Please call me if discussion or further information is required.

25X1

Yours,

John F. Stansfield, General
STANFIELD TURNER

November 28, 1977

Executive Registry

117-236914

Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Admiral Turner:

STAT
—
This is in reply to your letter of October 31, 1977, concerning your space needs [redacted] in Northern Virginia. The General Services Administration (GSA) has been working with your Real Estate and Construction Division in an effort to satisfy this requirement.


Your requirement was originally received by GSA on January 11, 1977. Immediately thereafter, GSA went on the market for the space within the delineated area. No offers were received and your space request was returned asking that you re-submit your request in a larger delineated area. By letter of September 13, 1977, your revised space request was received.

In recent months, it has become necessary to impose constraints on further acquisitions of space in the Metropolitan Washington area. We are therefore unable to take action on your request at this time.

However, you may be assured that your request will receive a high priority at such time in the future as it may be possible for the General Services Administration to lift those constraints.

Your understanding in this matter will be greatly appreciated.

Sincerely,


ALAN K. SOLOMON
Administrator

Att 3

26 OCT 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Acting Deputy Director of
Central IntelligenceFROM: Michael J. Malanick
Acting Deputy Director for
Administration

SUBJECT: Space Acquisition

REFERENCE: Ltr dtd 27 Sept 77 to Admin GSA for
A-DDCI

1. Action Requested: It is requested that you sign the attached letter to the Administrator of General Services Administration (GSA) requesting reconsideration of inclusion of CIA in an apparent Presidential freeze on acquisition of new Federal leased space (Att 1).

2. Background:

a. The Agency has had a pressing requirement for additional space since late 1975. Then Director Colby authorized acquisition of [redacted] of additional leased property in November 1975 (a copy of this authorization, which includes justification and may be of interest as a "backgrounder," is Attachment 3). Summarizing, the space requirement was created by the impending development of new automated systems [redacted] plus space requirements for expanding [redacted] staffs such as the Intelligence Community Staff, Office of Legislative Counsel, Office of General Counsel, and Inspector General.

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b. CIA's space utilization has historically been far better than most Federal agencies. Compared to the GSA guideline of 150 sq. ft. of office space

Downgrade to Administrative
Internal Use Only when separated
from attachments.

SUBJECT: Space Acquisition

per person, the Agency has averaged less than 120 sq. ft. per person in Headquarters and, throughout the Washington area (Headquarters included), less than 135 sq. ft. per person. These statistics alone represent *prima facie* justification for far more space than the [redacted] actually requested. As you are aware, since the date of the original request, more staff expansion has occurred. Your approved reorganization plan establishing NITC, among other entities, generates different and urgent requirements for both office and technical space.

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25X1 [redacted]

c. The DDA has continued to press GSA to meet the requirements formalized in late 1975 by reiterating and clarifying requirements in two subsequent letters. The last letter, dated 13 September 1977, was supplemented by a call from the Office of Logistics to GSA's Region 3 Commissioner for Public Buildings. He advised (and he has proven to be a good friend of the Agency) that an executive-level appeal to the Administrator and subsequent waiver were required before the Region could proceed to acquire new space. Accordingly, a letter to Administrator Solomon (Att 2) was forwarded by the Acting DDCI. Although a formal reply has not been received, it is understood that CIA's space requirements were larded with what we suspect are newer and less justifiable requests of other agencies and presented to President Carter on or about 15 October. It is further informally understood, as would be corroborated by Administrator Solomon's passing remark to you, that the President desires a hold-down on further Federal expansion in the Metropolitan Washington Area.

3. Staff Position: It is unequivocal that the Headquarters Building has exceeded the saturation point and

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SUBJECT: Space Acquisition

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that installation of space-sensitive equipment areas such as [redacted] cannot proceed without relocation of Headquarters elements to external buildings. External building utilization is such that no vacant space is available or can be generated by further consolidation. The most attractive and viable alternative is GSA leasing of additional space for Agency use. Should this approach fail, it will be necessary to pursue significantly less desirable alternatives such as using your extraordinary authority to directly lease operational space (with attendant political and legal complications). [redacted]

25X1
4. Recommendation: It is recommended that you sign a letter to the Administrator of GSA (Att 1) requesting reconsideration of acquisition of new leased space for CIA.

/s/ [redacted]

Michael J. Malenick

Atts

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Att 4

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Next 6 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Att 5

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Att 6

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SUMMARY OF EVENTS

10 Dec 1975 --	Agency forwards request for space (SF81) to GSA.
20 Jul 1976 --	GSA representatives tour Headquarters complex and satisfied that request valid.
23 Sep 1976 --	GSA advises our space request frozen pending determination National priorities.
8 Oct 1976 --	Agency responds to prioritization request. GSA assures request is on list.
9 Nov 1976 --	Agency forwards revised SF81.

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SUMMARY OF EVENTS (Continued)

2 May 1977 -- Director of Logistics meets with GSA to ascertain alternatives.

9 May 1977 -- GSA again solicits for space--negative results.

18 Aug 1977 -- GSA returns Agency's SF81 unable to acquire under terms stipulated.

13 Sep 1977 -- Agency submits revised SF81 incorporating GSA's suggestions to overcome previous obstacles.

20 Sep 1977 -- GSA advises it is unable to proceed with request (SF81) due to strict adherence to moratorium.

27 Sep 1977 -- A-DDCI writes to A-GSA requesting waiver to moratorium.

31 Oct 1977 -- DCI writes to A-GSA reiterating urgency that waiver be granted.

28 Nov 1977 -- A-GSA responds that he is unable to grant waiver requested.

28 Nov 1977 -- Regional Administrator (Region 3) writes asking recommendations re policy to reduce space holdings in NCR by 10 percent.

Att 7



General Services Administration Region 3
Washington, DC 20407

Executive Registry
77-10510

77-6305

NOV 28 1977

Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Dear Mr. Turner:

On October 27, 1977, the General Services Administration (GSA) presented a paper at the Assistant Secretaries Management Group. This paper, entitled Policy for Acquiring Space in the National Capital Region (copy enclosed), deals generally with three major points:

1. An immediate reduction of each agency's office space holdings by 10 percent.
2. A 5-year housing plan developed by the agencies in concert with GSA.
3. The possibility that certain agency functions can be located outside the National Capital Region (NCR).

The enclosed paper, as the cover sheet states, is merely an outline of a new policy. Before this policy is refined and formalized, we are asking each agency to submit in writing any comments, suggestions, or recommendations that might aid us in developing a firm, workable policy which will enable us to meet the Administration's goal of achieving optimum utilization of space. As the enclosed chart demonstrates, over the past 27 years the overall utilization rate for space occupied by Federal agencies in the NCR has increased sharply, contributing significantly to the cost of the Government. With your help, we can reverse this trend.

Sincerely,

John F. Galuardi

JOHN F. GALUARDI
Regional Administrator

Enclosures

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COMPARISON OF GSA-CONTROLLED SPACE IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION

YEAR	GOVERNMENT-OWNED			LEASED			TOTAL		
	SQ. FT.	PERS.	UTIL. RATE	SQ. FT.	PERS.	UTIL. RATE	SQ. FT.	PERS.	UTIL. RATE
1950	(91%) 24,984,081	150,546	165.9	(9%) 2,523,911	12,231	206.4	27,507,992	162,777	169.0
1960	(87%) 26,889,438	148,244	181.4	(13%) 3,913,405	13,416	291.7	30,802,843	161,660	190.5
1970	(70%) 35,614,954	169,686	209.9	(30%) 15,298,524	75,173	203.5	50,913,478	244,859	207.9
1977	(55%) 34,438,246	146,608	234.9	(45%) 27,706,029	118,737	233.3	62,144,275	265,345..	234.2

As shown above the GSA space inventory has increased 34.6 million square feet during the past 27 years for an average of 1.28 million square feet per year. During this same period, the number of Federal employees housed has increased a total of 102.6 thousand, for an average increase of 3.8 thousand employees per year. Overall, there has been a 63 percent increase of personnel and double the percentage or 126 percent increase in space.

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POLICY FOR ACQUIRING OFFICE SPACE IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION

1. Agencies, in concert with General Services Administration (GSA), will develop a 5-year housing plan. The housing will have as its basis the effective and efficient performance of the agencies' missions and programs. Incorporated into the plan will be such space saving approaches as consolidation, optimum space utilization and reduction of inadequate and obsolete space. A task force will be formed within GSA Region 3 to work with the agencies in developing these plans.
2. This plan will reflect, in part, an immediate minimum reduction in office space of 10 percent, based on a review of the agency's present space holdings.

This 10 percent will be used to satisfy outstanding space requests which meet the criteria in B, below.

Any request for space in excess of the 10 percent recapture should be reviewed by the agency for the following:

A. Is it essential from a program standpoint that the function for which the space has been requested remain in the National Capital Region or could it be located elsewhere?

B. Any requests for additional space must concern themselves only with personnel ceilings approved, authorized and appropriated by the Office of Management and Budget and budgeted for FY 1978 and 1979, and must contain a certification to this effect from the Under Secretary for Administration or an equivalent official.

On all major requests for space, GSA will conduct a joint survey with the requesting agency of the agency's space holdings to determine if all, or part of the request can be satisfied within the agency's existing holdings or will require acquisition of additional space.

3. Any portion of the aforementioned recaptured space not needed to accommodate existing requirements as defined above will be returned to GSA for reassignment.

POLICY FOR ACQUIRING SPACE IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION

Attached hereto is a paper outlining the new policy of the General Services Administration (GSA) governing the acquisition of space in the National Capital Region.

The purpose of this policy is to effect the Administration's goal of achieving optimum utilization of space. This can be accomplished through the joint efforts of GSA and the other agencies of the Federal Government.

Presented at the

Assistant Secretaries Management Group

October 27, 1977

Att 8

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

20 DEC 1977

Mr. John F. Galuardi
Regional Administrator, Region 3
General Services Administration
Washington, D.C. 20407

Dear Mr. Galuardi:

Your letter of November 28, 1977, to the Director of Central Intelligence regarding proposed policy for acquiring space in the National Capital Region (NCR) has been referred to this office for response.

The statistics enclosed with your letter certainly appear significant and the increases cited would indicate that some corrective action should be taken with regard to total federal space holdings in the NCR. CIA cannot, however, endorse a proposal for a blanket reduction of space holdings that does not take into consideration efficiencies and economies already achieved by individual agencies. Neither can CIA support total agency space holdings divided by total agency population as a meaningful space utilization statistic. As will be developed in the following paragraphs (and based on GSA published statistics for other federal agencies in the NCR), it is considered that CIA has the best, or very close to the best, space utilization in the federal government. In fact, CIA is "over utilizing" space to the point of lost operating efficiency. has justified acquisition of [redacted] and, as noted in a recent letter from Director Turner to Administrator Solomon, is prepared to present this requirement directly to President Carter if necessary.

As you are aware, CIA's space holdings in the NCR include special purpose space essential to the unique foreign intelligence mission of the Agency. [redacted]

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Mr. John F. Galuardi

Page 2

STAT.
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[REDACTED] Space requirements to house these special functions must be based on case-by-case professional analysis with consideration for equipment environment, supporting utilities, and personnel/equipment safety. To this end, CIA maintains a staff of architects and engineers who, in coordination with consultants and equipment manufacturers, do continuing analyses of special purpose space utilization. In virtually every instance, Agency utilization is better than manufacturer's recommendations or commercial guidelines; however, in all of CIA's space utilization activity, no statistical standard of square feet per person (sfp) for the combination of special purpose, warehouse, and office, i.e., total agency, space has been identified.

CIA does concur, and strongly, that sfp ratios for office space utilization are valid statistical standards. GSA planning guideline ratios (varying from 60 sfp to 300 sfp for grade and supervisory responsibility and averaging about 150 sfp) are considered to be excellent indicators of the efficiency of space utilization. Using data from GSA's "Quarterly Report on Assignment and Utilization of GSA Controlled Space in the NCR," it is observed that agencies roughly comparable in size, mission, or grade structure have office utilization rates as follows: AID, 246 sfp; DoD, 150 sfp; and Department of State, 202 sfp. The average for all agencies in the NCR is 171 sfp and GSA lists for itself 201 sfp. By contrast, the CIA office utilization rate for the NCR [REDACTED] CIA's main facility at Langley. If all other agencies in the NCR achieved CIA's utilization rate (admittedly too spartan; this is why new space is mandatory), GSA could reduce office space by some 11 million square feet in the NCR. CIA has achieved this utilization ratio, not only from continuing professional analysis by its architect/engineering staff, but also by circulation at top management levels of a quarterly computerized space utilization report identifying component usage down to the fifth supervisory echelon. For all of the above reasons (well known to GSA officers of your property management staff who have toured the facilities and observed the computerized space utilization report) CIA must object, and object strenuously, to any proposal for a blanket reduction in space holdings without regard to individual agency efficiencies.

Mr. John F. Galuardi

Page 3

It is recommended that GSA approach space economies by first establishing rigid but reasonable utilization ratios for office space; efficiency in special purpose space utilization should, perforce, follow. CIA would be pleased to participate or assist in any way possible in establishing quantifiable space utilization standards. CIA also endorses and will participate where possible in development of housing plans and programs.

With regard to transfer of additional CIA functions

STAT [redacted] CIA has already done this to the maximum extent feasible. In order to relieve CIA's current space congestion, a special, high-level committee reporting to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence was convened to review the mission and space needs of each and every CIA component in the NCR. Because of CIA's intelligence dissemination mission and the need for close liaison with the White House and executive agencies located in the NCR, it was determined impracticable to further decentralize CIA's headquarters staff.

The opportunity to comment on GSA's proposed policy is appreciated. If CIA's position seems strident, it is because implementation of a blanket 10 percent space reduction would be directly translated to a reduction of CIA's foreign intelligence capability. It is hoped that you will give CIA's position consideration when your policy is implemented.

Sincerely,

[redacted]

STAT

James H. McDonald
Director of Logistics

Att 9

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

4 November 1977

Mr. Joseph Malaga, Executive Director
Administrative Services Reorganization Project
Office of Management and Budget
Washington, D.C. 20503

Dear Mr. Malaga:

The opportunity to provide information for your study on organizational and procedural improvements to centrally provided, federal administrative services is appreciated. CIA is heavily reliant upon the General Services Administration (GSA) for a variety of services, predominantly in the Metropolitan Washington Area. The Agency is also dependent upon the support [redacted] for supplies and services, although more so in relation to [redacted]. In both instances, however, centralized support is made difficult by the unique aspects of Agency operations.

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As you are probably well aware, the Director of Central Intelligence is statutorily required to protect intelligence sources and methods including "... organization, functions, names, ... or numbers of personnel ..." These requirements, as recorded in a specific CIA exemption within the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, complicate the utilization of centralized federal services in many functional areas. Because of this statutory requirement and the necessity to directly support sensitive foreign activities, the Agency: maintains its own telecommunications capability; has a logistics organization providing supplies, administrative services, classified printing, and facilities support; has a centralized security organization which, among other responsibilities, coordinates Agency facilities protection by GSA Federal Protective Service officers; and operates, in coordination with the National Archives and Records Service, a records management and storage system.


The Administrative Services Reorganization Project memorandum requested views, problems, and priorities (and the assumption is made that, as it affects CIA, GSA services

Mr. Joseph Malaga

Page 2

are of primary concern). First, CIA's dependence on GSA's administrative services should be reiterated. The Agency does not have the size to perform all of these functions for itself, nor, given the resources, would it be desired to do so. On balance, GSA support of Agency activities is more than satisfactory and cooperation and responsiveness by GSA senior managers can only be rated as excellent. It is considered, however, that improvement is needed in GSA/CIA's joint efforts to acquire and maintain and operate facilities. This space acquisition/maintenance function is complicated by several factors: (1) the necessity to vigorously screen and/or escort all GSA employees and GSA contractors given access to Agency buildings; (2) the occasional necessity for very rapid acquisition, relocation, or modification of a facility either to house an impending, "state-of-the art," technical collection system, for security reasons, or to accommodate organizational change; (3) the geographic isolation of the CIA Headquarters complex from GSA's centralized professional staff and labor pool; (4) CIA's necessity to install and operate, on a 24-hour basis, highly technical, classified systems requiring dual, special utilities systems for primary and backup operation; (5) the

STAT



It is recognized that this area of primary concern is complex and that a substantial amount of additional information may be required. Accordingly, [redacted] Executive Officer, Office of Logistics [redacted] has been designated as the action officer for this initial phase and will provide what further data your staff may need.

STAT

STAT

The provision of central administrative services is of vital concern to CIA and of principal interest to this Directorate. Please call me if I can be of personal assistance or, if you have the opportunity, please let me arrange a luncheon and tour of our Langley facility.

Sincerely,

151

Michael J. Malanick
Acting Deputy Director
for
Administration

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DD/A Registry
78-245872
25 JUL 1978

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

25X1

FROM: [REDACTED]
Acting Director of Security

SUBJECT: Civilian Space Policy Review Group

25X1

1. [REDACTED] Attached for your review is a copy of a draft paper entitled "A Review of Satellite Reconnaissance Security Alternatives" which was prepared by a Working Group of the Civilian Space Policy Review Group in response to a requirement to review the implications of declassifying the "fact of" photographic satellite reconnaissance.

25X1

2. [REDACTED] Participants in preparation of the paper were Gus Weiss, Chairman, from Admiral Murphy's office in OSD, David Williamson of NASA, Lt. Col. James Welch of Air Force, Stephen Bond from the State Department and [REDACTED] of the Community Security Group. Major credit for the writing effort belongs to Mr. Williamson and Lt. Col. Welch.

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3. [REDACTED] I think you will agree that this paper represents a significant effort for a task that had a ten day deadline for submission to the Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President. It does not pretend to answer all questions that surround the issue, but hopes to draw to the attention of the policy maker a skeletal outline of problems and steps that must be faced should a decision be made to proceed with the declassification action.

25X1

4. [REDACTED] It represents the DCI's position and desire to see "how" we can declassify "fact of" rather than "why we shouldn't".

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Attachment

Downgrade to Confidential when separated from attachment.

E-2 IMPDET
CL BY [REDACTED]

SECRET

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05-8-2019 25X1

A REVIEW OF SATELLITE RECONNAISSANCE SECURITY POLICY ALTERNATIVES

I. Introduction and Objectives.

Presidential Directive NSC-37 established a security policy for space intelligence activities that states, inter alia, that "the fact that the US conducts satellite reconnaissance for intelligence purposes is classified CONFIDENTIAL (XGDS)" and that the special product controls (over imagery and other space-derived data) will be used sparingly by the DCI. This paper examines possible revisions to this policy, first in light of a simple declarative declassification only of the fact that the US conducts a classified satellite photography program as an adjunct to gaining SALT acceptance, and then in light of a possible extension of such declassification to selected reconnaissance imagery for furthering economic, social, and political objectives of the US.

II. Summary of Conclusions.

In summary, this very compressed review suggests the following:

1. Under appropriate circumstances and with stringent advance preparation, the "fact of" can be declassified with real but not unacceptable risks to intelligence security and to US foreign and domestic policy.

2. The benefits of declassifying the "fact of" alone are rather limited: there is an obvious, commonsense value to the forthright admission of what is widely known: there are some relatively short-lived public information values; and there may be some improvement in the credibility of SALT verification.
3. If a decision is reached to go beyond declassification of the "fact of" and to include a selective and time-phased public release of substantive imagery, both risks and benefits increase; it is believed that the risks, while far from negligible, could be adequately controlled and that the potential longer term benefits of such a policy revision warrant a very careful assessment of this possibility before its acceptance or rejection.
4. It is imperative that full and detailed execution and contingency plans be developed and assessed well in advance of overt policy change or official public statement on this matter.

III. Considerations of Implementation.

An implementation plan for such declassification of "fact of" and/or imagery must, more or less in the order noted below, address the following elements:

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1. The Congress. The Intelligence Committees and most of the senior leadership of both Houses are fully or sufficiently aware of the space intelligence program and its relation to NTM and verification. In case either limited or extended declassification is proposed, it would be necessary to fully brief the involved committees and the leadership on the purposes of the proposed policy change, the detailed action plan and contingency positions, and the longer range implications thereof. Without a Congressional consensus on the overall approach and, particularly, on the strict limitations of the scope of the declassification policy, it would not be prudent to proceed. On balance, it is deemed probable that such consensus could be reached and maintained if the proposal were thoughtfully worked out and the full prestige of the Administration were to back it.
2. The USSR. Given that "fact of" classification is largely a political consideration first designed to maintain a "gentlemen's agreement" with the USSR on the conduct of space intelligence and more recently to avoid confrontative questions in the area of NTM for SALT verification, it

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seems that the Soviet interest in a change in US policy would be so high as to require formal, high level consultation based on considerable frankness as to the scope and implication of the US proposal. The USSR has made a distinction between satellite reconnaissance for National Technical Means (NTM) of verification and satellite reconnaissance for "espionage." The Soviets have never explicitly stated their definition of the difference, however, and Soviet reaction to a proposed policy change is uncertain. The USSR is sensitive to world opinion about the relative technological capabilities of the US and the Soviet Union. Comparisons between Soviet and US NTM capabilities, even speculative, would cast the USSR in an unfavorable light. (The position taken by the USSR in the UN on allowable resolution limits for open dissemination of satellite imagery has already prompted unfavorable comparisons). Furthermore, the Soviets have expressed their sensitivity about US release of NTM issues discussed in the SALT Standing Consultative Committee. Second, the Soviets could view a public policy change as casting doubt on their ability to prevent "espionage" from outer space

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and, for internal and international prestige reasons, they might choose to take a tough line, including a more aggressive posture on ASATs and on the rights of overflight. Lastly, declassification could be viewed as a form of international "one-upsmanship" by the US, especially in light of current tensions. Such private consultation with the Soviets would stress the relationship of the proposed policy change to national acceptance of SALT II and, if imagery release were contemplated, the scope, content, purposes, and timing of such release. If the consultation results in a Soviet assessment that the impact would be relatively benign and that their net national interests were still protected, their real interest in SALT and their overall political posture vis-a-vis the US might lead to a favorable response. A negative Soviet reaction would not place at risk the technical security of space intelligence but would provide some further insight as to basic Soviet international political and military perceptions. Without an understanding as to the probable Soviet posture, it would seem unwise to proceed unilaterally with a policy change.

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3. US Intelligence Security.

a. The classification of the "fact of" satellite reconnaissance has served as the first line of defense for overhead intelligence programs. After declassification, US agencies and officials could expect to be under considerable pressure to provide more information in a climate in which intelligence photography and perhaps other information is known to be available. Moreover, interpretation of photography alone is ambiguous; intelligence information is derived from a careful professional analysis of data from several sources, including SIGINT. Compromise of these electronic systems could result from explanations and interpretations accompanying even selective release of photography. This argues that careful, well thought out strategies of information release and management of requests and criticisms are necessary adjuncts to declassification of the "fact of." It seems highly unlikely that declassification of the "fact of" alone could take place, with absolute refusal to release any more information about derived

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data, sources, methods, and analysis. Some additional information is certain to be released, whether inadvertently or purposefully thereby threatening at least a partial compromise of intelligence discipline.

b. This then argues for development of a strict and coherent revised security policy prior to implementation of a policy change. Elements should include: a firm and uniform Executive Branch administrative penalty policy (dismissal) for violations of space intelligence guidelines; advance instructions to all in-place security officers in Federal, industrial, and academic institutions; briefings for senior former members of the space intelligence community to establish the limits of intended disclosure; establishing a central single source for responses to public queries.

4. Allies. Given that US friends and allies are either direct or indirect beneficiaries of the US intelligence programs, their interest in preserving unimpeded access to valid intelligence information would have to be assured through consultations that outlined the limits and extents of planned disclosure and the political assessment of

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external (i.e., Soviet and other) reactions. Particular care would have to be given to the question of possible imagery release by the US of data taken over Allied countries; it is not clear at this time that any such release from intelligence systems should be contemplated without the prior consent or even through the intermediary of the friendly nation. Those who have had access to classified satellite imagery in the past may react quite differently than those who have not.

5. International Reactions.

a. The program to gain tacit acceptance by all countries of the principle of overhead data collection has been primarily possible through the efforts of civil remote sensing programs. This gradual, de facto approach has been low-key and very successful, taking into account those data which could potentially impinge on US intelligence programs and on international sensitivities about strategic-quality information. A precipitous US shift from this gradualism may force governments to take positions they have otherwise avoided taking. The ensuing reactions could tend to blur distinctions,

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both in the minds of the US public and foreign countries, between the use of space for beneficial and military purposes. It has in the past been considered to be in the best interests of the US to promote an image of satellites being only for certain humanitarian purposes and to avoid tainting this image by blending in other actual or potential uses for satellites.

b. Developing countries (LDCs) recognize that they can benefit from remote sensing of their territory.

However, the LDCs generally are arguing for a restrictive legal regime governing these activities, asserting that release of remote sensing data to third parties without their prior consent is a violation of their national sovereignty and poses a threat to their economic and national security. The effect of a US disclosure of satellite reconnaissance could be to stiffen their resolve to restrict overhead reconnaissance. One would expect that the obvious international benefits of nuclear arms control would soften such arguments. The record of the LDCs in the United Nations, while largely one of narrow self-interest, may not be an

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accurate measure of real LDC responses, however, to the extent that they have a sincere desire to further nuclear arms control.

c. Pressure for a more clearly defined international legal regime for space would probably increase in the United Nations as a result of declassification of "fact of." The United Nations has assiduously avoided formal consideration of satellite operations related to military or national intelligence purposes, and UN discussions deal only with remote sensing of the earth and its natural resources, but an announcement by the US could force the issue. Countries previously quiescent about overhead reconnaissance would be forced to take a position on the basic questions concerning sovereignty, internal and external security, and exploitation by more powerful states. Accusations of superpower hegemony by the PRC is one example of a possible reaction. Such reactions could have a heavy impact on the still-developing international law of outer space. While the US, Soviet, and French position is that photo reconnaissance of the earth from space is

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not precluded by applicable international law, many states if forced to take a position on the issue are likely to seek a restrictive regime or to deny entirely the legitimacy of such activities, at least without prior consent. This would place both US civilian and military space programs on the defensive. Just as could happen with the USSR, prior consultation would be helpful if the US could be sure of eliciting an affirmative or neutral response; but a negative response would exacerbate the risk of adverse political reactions.

6. US Public Reactions.

- a. The case for the verifiability of a SALT II agreement could be made more convincingly to the public if an explanation could be offered as to how the verification is accomplished. An announcement that the US verifies such agreements by use of satellite reconnaissance may allay fears about Soviet cheating and contribute to public and Congressional support for a SALT II agreement. Since much of the informed public, press, and Congress already assumes satellite reconnaissance, the increase in support might be marginal; this margin could mean

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the difference in eventual ratification in the US Senate. The announcement could also serve to affirm the commitment of the Administration to greater openness in government and the promotion of space operations for keeping the peace. Without public examples of data quality, however, there is some question as to the degree of public satisfaction on verifiability.

b. There is no question that data on space intelligence would be sought under the FOIA and that, in the worst case, legal proceedings could force disclosures inimical to intelligence discipline and national security unless impeccable guidelines were established and maintained as to what is classified and why (see 3b, *supra*).

IV. A Concept for Further Study.

Preliminary review suggests the possibility of a new national policy in the use of remotely sensed imaged data for a spectrum of US interests, both domestic and foreign. The focus of such a policy would be on the use of remotely sensed data and the information that can be derived therefrom, not on the management or control of the systems which collect such data.

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The purpose that could be served is an expansion of the utility of data and information to the nation without incurring severe political and national security costs.

1. Features of Policy Concept.

- a. The fact that US space systems collect photographic data for national security purposes is declassified.
- b. The security protection afforded to all the systems -- space and other -- which collect global military and intelligence data is continued and enhanced to preserve a "band of uncertainty" as to US capabilities, limitations, vulnerabilities, and importance.
- c. The US will begin a careful, time phased, centrally controlled and evolutionary process of releasing selected reconnaissance imagery into the public domain in two ways:
 - 1) For economic and development purposes, release selected blocks of mapping quality imagery of the US from the existing archives as an adjunct to the existing data base.
 - 2) For policy purposes dealing with specific US interests, use individual samples of imagery

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(archival or new) on a privileged or public basis when credible evidence is required on particular conditions or events.

- 3) Depending on international reactions during and after the initial period of release of US imagery only selected blocks of foreign coverage may be released either bilaterally or openly.
- d. Since the organized release of previously classified imagery will supplement, not replace, the growing capabilities of civil space systems responsible for continuing and updating the global data base from space, developing national and international expectancies will have to be met by operational civil systems such as follow-on earth and ocean survey satellites and Shuttle-based film return capabilities in the 1980's and beyond; the priorities of on-going space intelligence systems remain the national security interests of the US.

2. Potential Benefits.

- a. The broader use of previously classified and compartmented data could well be an efficient means of meeting

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important domestic needs for an authoritative data base supplementing (or in some cases replacing) imagery sources currently available to the private and public sector. For example, stereoscopic imagery of cartographic quality has already been collected over most of the world; its exploitation has been strictly limited to government intelligence and mapping functions; its value to mineral and petroleum exploration -- either in raw image form or as analyzed thematic geological map products -- is likely to be high if properly used, representing as it does a quantum increase in the exploration data base. By limiting release to existing imagery of the US, no added burden is placed on current intelligence collection systems. The additional burden on the intelligence community of sorting and reviewing appropriate US regional data sets for phased release would depend upon the rate of release desired; presuming that such release is aimed at bridging the period until similar materials can be collected by open civil programs (e.g., Shuttle Large Format Camera), the effort could be spread over some

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three or four years without becoming unduly burdensome.

b. Other economic applications of space data dealing with dynamic phenomena -- land use changes, disaster assessment and relief, environmental monitoring, crop productivity -- require the repetitive coverage being offered by civil systems and not envisaged for intelligence systems. Such civil uses would also benefit considerably from the availability of a high quality imagery data base even if quite old.

c. A new dimension of flexibility could be provided in the US in international affairs by less-constrained use of remote sensing data: peacekeeping possibilities might include private or public release of visual evidence and analysis of impending crisis, hostile actions, or threatening situations (weapons shipments, border violations, guerrilla concentrations, nuclear capabilities); selective economic development information can be provided without subterfuge as to data sources; and treaty verifiability and verification can be more credibly demonstrated as needed for domestic and international audiences.

3. Implementation Approaches.

- a. All the issues noted in Section III, supra, would have to be dealt with in detail before this concept could be implemented; in addition, some purely domestic issues stemming from release of imagery of the US might arise in the areas of privacy or of use of such data for law enforcement purposes.
- b. If implementation barriers were overcome and foreseeable new problems contained in a detailed plan, an eventual policy structure might take the following direction:
 - 1) The US is dedicated to the concept of open available and freely interchanged data about the world -- for the social, environmental, and economic betterment of human society. Note that this is the objective as put into law in the 1958 space act.
 - 2) Civil space programs will, in the future as in the past, continue to make available data on a global basis except in times of national emergency; data from our military space programs will be used to supplement civil data through the periodic release

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of significant data sets useful for specialized cartographic, geological, and related analyses.

- 3) To support these ends, certain previously restricted space data acquired by the Defense Department in pursuit of its national security mission will be made available through official channels.
- 4) This approach is designed to meet several major objectives: the reduction of classified data and activities, the preservation of national security as required, the integrated use of US resources to meet the needs of the country and the world, and the dedication of technology to humane purposes.
- 5) The continued separation between civil and military activities in space is fundamental to the US way of life. Space must remain open and free for the use of all nations in seeking their own objectives, and hostilities in space must be forbidden.

V. Recommendation.

Given that the initial assessments outlined above appear reasonable, it is clear that further work on analyzing the concept of a space intelligence security policy change is in

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is in order. This effort should fall into four phases:

1. An intensive analysis of the points and possibilities noted in this paper by a few key individuals selected from the Departments of Defense and State, the intelligence community, and the Executive Office of the President under the direction of a senior NSC member. This could be accomplished within 4 to 6 weeks; with an additional 2-week period for official agency comment.
2. Presidential review and decision on desirability of change and appropriate scope thereof in 3 weeks.
3. Detailed development and setting in place of the implementation elements -- consultation strategies, security planning, contingency plans -- by the responsible agencies over a period of at least 12 to 16 weeks.
4. Execution after final Presidential review and approval.

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